Extraterritorial Reach of NEPA\u27s EIS Requirement after Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey by Klick, Karen A.
NOTES
THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF
NEPA'S EIS REQUIREMENT AFTER
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND v. MASSEY
KAREN A. KLICK
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction . .................................... 292
I. Historical and Legal Background ................. 294
A. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality ...... 294
B. The National Environmental Policy Act ......... 296
1. Statutory language ....................... 297
2. Legislative history ....................... 298
3. Administrative interpretation .............. 300
4. Executive interpretation .................. 301
C. Case Law ................................. 303
II. The Case: Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey ...... 308
A. The Facts . ............................... 308
B. The Decision on Appeal .................... 310
1. The presumption against extraterritoriality
is not applicable ........................ 310
2. The unique status of Antarctica ............ 312
3. Foreign policy considerations .............. 313
4. Statutory interpretation ................... 314
III. Analysis ..................................... 315
A. Clear Holding, Unclear Reasoning May Limit
Precedential Weight ........................ 315
B. Benefits of an International NEPA ............. 317
IV. Recommendations ............................ 318
Conclusion ....................................... 322
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSrIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:291
INTRODUCTION
The environmental consequences of one nation's actions aie rarely
confined within its borders.' The nuclear catastrophe in Chernobyl
attests to the great dangers of modem society and to the necessity for
environmental responsibility.2 Even the most benevolent attempts to
aid other nations may have harmful consequences.3 A poignant
example of development disaster is the Aswan Dam project in Egypt,
funded by the Soviet Union.4 Since the project began, disease rates
for a serious blood disease caused by water parasites have skyrocketed
among the farmers along the Upper Nile.
5
To avoid potential environmental disasters, it is essential that the
U.S. Government assess the impact its agencies' actions may have,
both within and beyond this country's geographic borders. The
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) requirement' of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)7 is the most important provision
of our nation's environmental policy.8 Section 102(2) (C) of NEPA
provides a general outline of an EIS. An EIS must be prepared for
1. See generally Jeffrey B. Groy & Gail L. Wurtzler, International Implication of United States
Environmental Laws, 8 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 7 (1993) (discussing transnational scope of
recent environmental disasters);Jonathan Turley, "Mien in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and
the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 598, 658-59 (1990) (noting recent
disasters prompting more international perspective on environmental problems).
2. See Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerard, International Impact Assessment, N.Y.LJ., Oct.
25, 1991, at 3 (noting how Chernobyl accident, which released radioactive cloud, prompted
allegations by neighboring countries that Soviet Union violated binding principles of
international law by failing to notify others of emergency).
3. See 124 CONG. REc. 11,804 (1978) (remarks by Charles Warren, Chairman, Council on
Environmental Quality). For instance, following World War II, the United States introduced a
program to improve conditions in the Ryukyu Islands. Id. The program attempted to provide
better sanitary and dietary conditions in island schools. Id. These "improvements" led to a large
outbreak of dysentery and to the spread of an eye disease that causes blindness. Id. In
Indonesia, rice farmers used imported pesticide to kill insects harmful to the rice crop, id., but
the pesticide also killed the fish that farmers depended on to provide a cash crop, fertilize the
rice paddies, control insects, and consume as an essential source of nutrition, id. In Brazil, a
hydroelectric project caused unexpected environmental repercussions in the surrounding valley.
Id. The ensuing cost to resettle farmers and control floods was over $150 million. Id.
4. Id.
5. See id. (stating that infection within local farm population leapt from 5% to 65%).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1988).
7. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370c (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
8. See Amy J. Sauber, The Application of AEPA to Nuclear Weapons Production, Storage, and
Testing: Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, 11 B.C. ENVr'L AFF.
L. REV. 805, 813 (1984) (explaining provision's critical importance as enforcement mechanism
for Act's policy).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (i)-(v). Section 102(2) (C) of NEPA reads:
[A]I1 agencies of the Federal Government shall include in every recommendation or
report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the
responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
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"every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment.""° The required content of an EIS varies with
each case," but the purpose remains constant: to ensure reasoned
decisions by noting adverse environmental impacts of, and consider-
ing alternatives to, any proposed major federal action.12 The EIS
requirement is important because it is the "action-forcing" provi-
sion13 of an essentially procedural statute. 4
This Note discusses the application of NEPA's EIS requirement"5
outside of the United States. Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, in Environmental Defense Fund v.
Massey,16 considered whether NEPA's EIS requirement applied to a
National Science Foundation (NSF) plan to incinerate food wastes in
Antarctica.' The court in Massey held that NEPA's EIS requirement
applied to federal actions in Antarctica." Massey is significant
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal
be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Id.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
11. For a general discussion of the contents of an EIS, see ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK
452-53 (Government Institutes, 10th ed. 1989). See also David A. Wirth, in Keith Highet &
George Kahale III, Intemational Decsions, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 626, 627 (1993) (discussing, based
on regulations and case law, EIS content requirements).
12. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1982)
(requiring agencies under NEPA to take "hard look" at environmental consequences of any
proposed major federal action).
13. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (1992). Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations state
that:
The primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is to serve as an action-
forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined in the Act are infused into
the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government. It shall provide full
and fair discussion of significant environmental impacts and shall inform decision
makers and the public of the reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize
adverse impacts or enhance the quality of the human environment. Agencies shall
focus on significant environmental issues and alternatives . ... An environmental
impact statement is more than a disclosure document. It shall be used by Federal
officials in conjunction with other relevant material to plan actions and make decisions.
Id.
14. See Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (stating that
NEPA's mandate to agencies is essentially procedural); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 553 (1978) (noting that, because it creates
no substantive rights, NEPA's power comes from imposition on agencies of procedural duties
designed to ensure environmental considerations are part of federal agency decision-making).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1988).
16. 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
17. Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
18. Id. at 529.
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because the court concluded that the presumption against extraterri-
torial application19 of U.S. statutes did not apply.20 The decision
reversed the lower court's holding2' and weakened the presumption
that U.S. environmental laws do not apply extraterritorially.2
2
Part I of this Note presents a historical background, discussing the
presumption against extraterritoriality, the National Environmental
Policy Act, and case law interpreting NEPA's extraterritorial reach.
Part II reviews the facts of Massey and the decision of the circuit court.
Part III discusses the ramifications of Massey and suggests that the
decision has limited precedential weight and thus fails to clarify an
unsettled area of law. Although the decision applies NEPA
extraterritorially, the reasoning in Massey provides future interpreters
of the statute with two distinct and opposite paths of logic to apply to
the "NEPA-abroad" dilemma. Part IV suggests recommendations for
strengthening NEPA's EIS procedures around the world.
I. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
There exists a presumption against the extraterritorial application
of U.S. laws. Generally, laws of the United States are applied only
within the geographic boundaries of the country.23 The U.S.
Supreme Court discussed this standard in Foley Bros. v. Filardo,
24
which addressed the extraterritorial application of a law requiring
overtime pay for employees working more than eight hours a day. 5
The plaintiff in the case, an American cook, sued Foley Bros., an
19. See infra Part L.A (examining presumption against extraterritoriality).
20. Massey, 986 F.2d at 532, 533; see infra notes 178-230 and accompanying text (discussing
reasons court did not apply presumption against extraterritoriality).
21. Environmental Defense Fundv. Massey, 772 F. Supp. 1296 (D.D.C. 1991), reu'd, 986 F.2d
528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
22. See infra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing ruling in Foley Bros. v. Filard, 336
U.S. 281 (1949), that U.S. legislation is presumed to preside only within U.S. boundaries); note
29 and accompanying text (discussing holding in Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991), that presumption against extraterritoriality is
overcome by proof of congressional intent to apply statute abroad).
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OFTHE UNITED STATES § 402 (1)
(1987):
[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect
within its territory.
Id.; see also Turley, supra note 1, at 599-600 (describing presumption against extraterritoriality
and its use in interpreting ambiguous legislation).
24. 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
25. 40 U.S.C. §§ 324-325(a) (1940) (repealed 1962).
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American company, for denying him overtime compensation for work
he did at construction sites in Iran and Iraq. 6 The Court held that
U.S. legislation applies only within U.S. territory, absent a contrary
intent of Congress. 7 The underlying rationale of the Foley presump-
tion involves recognizing the legislation's domestic character and thus
avoiding international conflicts of law."
Recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Foley presumption in
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co.
(Aramco).29 The issue presented was whether Tide VII3" of the Civil
Rights Act of 196431 applies extraterritorially. 2 The Court held
that it does not.3 To overcome the presumption against statutory
extraterritoriality, the Court required proof of an affirmative
congressional intent to apply the statute outside U.S. territory.
34
Again invoking a concern for conflicts of law, the Court in Aramco
explained that the purpose of the presumption is "to protect against
the unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations
which could result in international discord."33  According to this
view, imposing U.S. laws on other countries upsets comity and breeds
resentment.36  The Court in Aramco interpreted the Foley presump-
tion to be an irrebuttable presumption against extraterritoriality.
3 7
Interestingly, the presumption is not irrebuttable in all cases.
Rather, courts have used different standards to interpret the extrater-
ritorial scope of statutes, differentiating between market statutes
(antitrust and securities) and non-market statutes (employment
26. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 283 (1949).
27. Id. at 285.
28. See id. at 285-86 (reasoning that Congress legislates domestic matters, not those of
another sovereign country); see also Turley, supra note 1, at 656 (explaining rationale in Foley as
based on Congress' desire to avoid international conflicts of law and to legislate domestic
concerns).
29. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to -3 (1988) (prohibiting discriminatory employment practices
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
31. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000 to 2000h-6 (1988)).
32. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499
U.S. 244, 246-47 (1991). The case involved the alleged harassment based on religion and
national origin of an American employee by an American corporation in Saudi Arabia. Id.
33. Id. (holding that Title VII does not apply outside United States to protect U.S. citizens
who are employees of U.S. corporations).
34. Id. at 248.
35. Id.
36. See V. Rock Grundman, TheNewlmperialism: TheExtratenritorialApplication of United States
Law, 14 INT'L LAW. 257, 258 (1980) (suggesting that exporting U.S. laws and regulations may
be seen as moral or legal imperialism and, therefore, resented by international community).
37. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
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discrimination and environmental)." Starting with the presumption
that in order for a statute to apply extraterritorially there must be
clear evidence of congressional intent, courts have uniformly rejected
extraterritorial application of non-market statutes." Courts have,
however, interpreted ambiguous market statutes with greater
flexibility, allowing extraterritorial application of those that meet
certain territorial effects or conduct requirements.4 0
B. The National Environmental Policy Act
NEPA lacks the clear statement of congressional intention required
to apply statutes outside the United States." Moreover, NEPA's
statutory language, legislative history, and administrative and executive
interpretations are considered largely inconclusive on the issue of
extraterritorial application.42
38. SeeTurley, supra note 1, at 599-601 (arguing that market and non-marketstatutes receive
disparate treatment from judiciary, encouraging extraterritorial application of former and
discouraging that of latter).
39. See Turley, supra note 1, at 617-34 (citing Benz v. Compania Naviera Hiclalso, S.A., 353
U.S. 138, 146 (1957) (limiting extraterritorial application of U.S. law pertaining to foreign vessels
that dock in American ports); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 286 (1949) (holding that
extraterritorial application requires clear expression of congressional intent); Boureslan v.
Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014, 1020-21 (1988) (rejecting extraterritorial application of laws forbidding
racial discrimination), azfd on reh ; 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990); Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345, 1348-49 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (preventing
extraterritorial application of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978); Cleary v. United States
Lines, 555 F. Supp. 1251, 1263 (D.N.J. 1983), aftd, 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984) (declining
extraterritorial application of laws against age discrimination); Air Line Dispatching Ass'n v.
National Mediation Bd., 189 F.2d 685, 690-91 (D.C. Cir.) (stating that legislation is ordinarily
to be given only domestic application), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951)).
'10. See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927) (holding that
conspiracies furthered by agreements within United States, but operating in foreign countries,
are subject to U.S. laws); United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87, 106
(1913) (noting that strict territorial approach would leave many foreign corporations
unregulated by either United States or foreign jurisdictions); Bersch v. Diexel Firestone, Inc.,
519 F.2d 974, 1000 (2d Cir.) (ruling that securities violations having direct and foreseeable
effects on U.S. markets could be applied extraterritorially), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975);
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.) (holding that securities violations could
be found in extraterritorial sale of shares), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,
443 (2d Cir. 1945) (stating that extraterritorial application is permissible where defendants
intend market effects); see also Turley, supra note 1, at 608-17 (discussing cases allowing
extraterritorial application of market statutes).
41. Compare NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (overlooking
statement of extraterritorial application of NEPA) with 33 U.S.C. § 1902 (a) (1) (1988) (applying
Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships to U.S. ship "wherever located"). The latter provision evinced a clear congressional intent
to apply the statute to U.S. ships beyond U.S. territory.
42. See, e.g., Turley, supra note 1, at 628-29 (noting that broad language of NEPA has not
overcome presumption against extraterritoriality); George H. Keller, Note, Greenpeace v. Stone:
The Comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement and the Extraterritorial Reach of the NEPA, 14 U.
RAW. L. REV. 751, 768-71 (1992) (noting how vagueness of language, legislative history, and
interpretive regulations of NEPA lead to difficulties in determining congressional intent
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1. Statutory language
The broad and wide-reaching language of NEPA has led some to
conclude that the text evinces a congressional intent to apply the
statute beyond the territorial borders of the United States.43 Others
argue that the language merely sets forth boilerplate generalities.'
The statute's sweeping stated purpose is "[tlo declare a national
policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony
between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and
stimulate the health and welfare of man."45
Section 101 of NEPA is the congressional declaration of the
national environmental policy.46 In it, the 91st Congress, "recogniz-
ing the profound impact of man's activity on the interrelations of all
components of the natural environment, ... [and] the critical
importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the
overall welfare and development of man,"4 7 declared it the Federal
Government's policy "to use all practicable means and measures....
to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive
harmony."48 The nonrestrictive language of NEPA suggests a global
purpose.49
In the EIS provision, 0 section 102(2) (C), Congress called on "all
agencies of the Federal Government"" to prepare an EIS for "major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment."52 There are several federal agencies whose activities
regarding extraterritorial application); Comment, NEPA"sRoleinProtectingthe World Environmen
131 U. PA. L. REV. 353, 360-64 (1982) (commenting on NEPA's inconclusive legislative history).
43. See David Young, The Applications of Environmental Impact Statements to UnitedStates
Participation in MultinationalDevelopment Projects, 8 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 309, 316-17 (1992)
(arguing that NEPA's language implies extraterritorial application).
44. See generally Comment, The Scope of the National Environmental Policy Act: Should the
102(2) (C) Impact Statement Provision BeApplicable to a FederalAgency Activities HavingEnvironmental
Consequences Within Another Sovereign's Jurisdiction?, 5 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L. & COM. 317 (1978)
(arguing that general language of NEPA cannot be interpreted to extend to extraterritorial
application).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
46. Id. § 4331.
47. Id. § 4331 (a).
48. Id.
49. See supra note 43.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C).
51. Id. § 4332(2).
52. Id. § 4332(2) (C).
1994]
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
are largely international," yet no language in the statute provides
that the EIS requirement does not apply to the international activities
of these agencies.54 Section 102(2) (F) further requires all federal
agencies to "recognize the worldwide and long-range character of
environmental problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy
of the United States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolu-
tions, and programs designed to maximize international cooperation




Significant commentary on the nation's environmental policy began
with ajoint House-Senate Colloquium to Discuss a National Policy for
the Environment, the highlights of which were presented in the
Congressional White Paper on a National Policy for the Environment.6 The
White Paper addressed international aspects of environmental
management, and in particular recognized the pressing need to
consider the environmental effects of foreign aid and development
projects.5 Included in the White Paper as a summary of the
colloquium's sentiment was a quotation by Dr. Dillon Ripley: "[T] o
speak about environmental quality without at least referring to the
fact of the international components and consequences of even our
activity as Americans ... appears to me to be somewhat shortsight-
ed."58 The final section of the White Paper suggested language for a
statement of policy outlining Congress' intent to consider the
environment in a "worldwide context."59 The White Paper further
stressed that a national environmental policy should be based on its
53. See Gary M. Ernsdorff, The Agency for International Development and NEPA: A Duty
Unfulfilled, 67 WASH. L. REv. 133, 152 n.136 (1992) (listing federal agencies of international
character, including Agency for International Development, Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Export-Import Bank, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Agriculture, Department of
Commerce, Department of Defense, Department of State, and Federal Highway Administration)
(citing 124 CONG. REc. 11,803 (1978)).
54. See ENVIRONMENTALI. LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at 465-66 (asserting that nothing
in NEPA's EIS requirement subjects agencies with international responsibilities to standards
different from other agencies).
55. 42 U.S.c. § 4332(2)(F).
56. Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs and House Comm. on Science and
Astronautics, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., Congressional White Paper on a National PolicyfortheEnvironment
(July 17, 1968), rqinted in 115 CONG. REC. 29,078-82 (1969).
57. Id. at 29,079.
58. Id. at 29,080; see also Nicholas C. Yost, NEPA: A System That Works-Everjwher4 8 ENVTL.
F. 28, 28 (1991) (-The wisdom of [NEPA's] proposition does not lose its force at the water's
edge.").
59. 115 CONG. REc. at 29,081-82.
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effect on global ecological relationships."
Another helpful explanation of the substance of the Act, as agreed
on by both Houses, can be found in the Conference Report on
NEPA.P During Senate consideration of the report, SenatorJackson
emphasized the vast importance of NEPA.62 In his prefatory com-
ments, SenatorJackson brought particular attention to an amendment
he sponsored, section 102(2) (F).6" The Section-by-Section Analysis
of the report specifically addressed section 102 (2) (F) and interpreted
it as mandating international responsibility for federal agency actions,
in light of the fact that their environmental impact frequently reaches
beyond lines on a map.' The purpose of the section, according to
Senator Jackson, is to authorize federal agencies to cooperate
internationally in managing global environmental problems.65
Further clarification of NEPA's extraterritorial applicability came in
1970 from oversight hearings held on agency compliance with
NEPA.66 The State Department interpreted NEPA's EIS provision as
limited to actions within the United States, and therefore not
applicable to the State Department's foreign aid programs. 67 The
congressional subcommittee firmly rejected this view and determined
that the State Department's interpretation of NEPA was contrary to
the language and intent of the statute: "Stated most charitably, the
Committee disagrees with this interpretation of NEPA. The history
of the Act makes it quite clear that the global effects of environmental
decisions are inevitably a part of the decision-making process and
must be considered in that context."' The subcommittee concluded
that section 102 (2) (C) of NEPA requires an environmental assessment
60. Id. at 29,082 ("[T]he global character of ecological relationships must be the guide for
domestic activities. Ecological considerations should be infused into all international
relations.").
61. H.R. REP. No. 765,91st Cong., 1stSess. 7-12 (1969), repinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2767.
62. S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 21, reprinted in 115 CONG. REc. 40,416 (1969)
(stating that NEPA "is the most important and far-reaching environmental-conservation measure
ever acted upon by the Congress").
63. Id.
64. Id. at 40,420. Specifically, the Analysis stated: "In recognition of the fact that
environmental problems are not confined by political boundaries, all agencies of the Federal
Government which have international responsibilities are authorized and directed to lend
support to appropriate international efforts to anticipate and prevent a decline in the quality
of the worldwide environment." Id.
65. Id. at 40,417 ("We must seek solutions to environmental problems on an international
level because they are international in origin and scope. The earth is a common resource, and
cooperative effort will be necessary to protect it.").
66. HOUSE COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, ADMINISTRATION OF THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 92-316, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
67. Id. at 32.
68. Id. at 33.
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of federal agencies' foreign projects.69
3. Administrative interpretation
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) was created by Title
II of the National Environmental Policy Act.70  Until abolished in
1993,71 the CEQ was responsible for overseeing the achievement of
goals set forth in our national environmental policy, including
gathering information and advising the President on environmental
issues. 72 In 1976, in accordance with the CEQ's mandate to make
policy recommendations, 73 the Chairman of the CEQ issued a
memorandum on the extraterritorial application of NEPA's EIS
provision.74 The memorandum defines the "human environment"
language of section 102(2) (C) to include not only the United States,
but also other nations and territories. 7' The memorandum con-
cludes with a clear mandate to apply NEPA's EIS requirement to all
federal actions significantly affecting the environment anywhere on
the globe.76
In 1977, President Carter issued Executive Order 11,991. 77 The
Executive Order amended the responsibilities of the CEQ to include
issuing regulations to federal agencies for implementing NEPA's
procedural provisions. 78 Accordingly, the CEQ promulgated regula-
tions to implement NEPA's EIS requirement.79 The Executive Order
also required all federal agencies to comply with the CEQ regula-
69. Id.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 4344(3) (1988).
71. See 139 CONG. REC. H10,382 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 4344. Section 204 of NEPA details the duties and functions of the CEQ.
Id.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 4344(8).
74. Russel W. Peterson, Memorandum on Application of the EIS Requirement to
Environmental Impacts Abroad of Major Federal Actions (Sept. 24, 1976), 42 Fed. Reg. 61,068,
61,068 (1977) [hereinafter CEQ Memorandum].
75. Id.
76. Id. at 61,069. The memorandum concludes:
In summary, the Council believes that the impact statement requirement in
§ 102(2)(C) of NEPA applies to all significant effects of proposed federal actions on
the quality of the human environment-in the United States, in other countries, and
in areas outside the jurisdiction of any country. Accordingly, agency officials
responsible for analyzing the potential environmental effects of proposed actions
should fully assess the potential impacts outside the United States, as well as those
within it; if any of these potential impacts are likely to be significant, an impact
statement should be prepared.
Id.
77. Exec. Order No. 11,991, 3 C.F.R. 123 (1978), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988)
(amending Exec. Order No. 11,514).
78. Id. § 1.
79. Council on Environmental Quality, 40 C.F.R § 1500.1 (a) (1993).
[Vol. 44:291
1994] ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND V. MASSEY
ions.80 In Andrus v. Sierra Club," the Supreme Court affirmed the
CEQ's authority to interpret NEPA and issue regulations on the
implementation of NEPA's procedural provision by holding that the
CEQ's interpretation of NEPA should be given substantial defer-
ence."2 The Court characterized Executive Order 11,991 as a
"detailed and comprehensive process, ordered by the President, of
transforming advisory guidelines into mandatory regulations applica-
ble to all federal agencies."83
4. Executive interpretation
In reaction to the 1976 CEQ memorandum, some federal agencies
objected on foreign policy grounds to applying NEPA's EIS require-
ments to their international activities.84 Attempting to clarify NEPA's
interpretation, President Carter issued Executive Order 12,114 in
January of 1979.5 The Order was intended to direct agency NEPA
procedures with respect to the international environmental effects of
major federal actions, 6 but has been largely ineffectual.87
Executive Order 12,114 was based on a compromise between the
CEQ and federal agencies with international responsibilities,88 and
was intended to further environmental objectives consistent with the
80. Exec. Order No. 11,991, supra note 77, at 124.
81. 442 U.S. 347 (1979). The plaintiffs involved in Andrus were three environmental
organizations who alleged that proposed budget cuts for the National Wildlife Refuge System
were major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and,
therefore, required preparation of an EIS. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1979).
The issue in the case was whether NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an EIS for
appropriation requests. Id. at 34849. The Court, relying on CEQ's interpretive regulations, 40
C.F.R. § 1506.8(a), held that NEPA does not require an EIS for an appropriation request,
because it is neither a proposal for legislation nor a proposal for major federal action. Id. at
355, 361, 364-65.
82. Id. at 357-58.
83. Id. at 358.
84. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at 466.
85. Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
86. Id. § 1. In pertinent part, § 1 reads:
[T]his Order furthers the purpose of the National Environmental Policy Act, ...
consistent with the foreign policy and national security policy of the United States, and
represents the United States government's exclusive and complete determination of
the procedural and other actions to be taken by Federal agencies... with respect to
the environment outside the United States, its territories and possessions.
Id.
87. See Glenn Pincus, Comment, The "NEPA-Abroad" Controversy: Unresolved by an Executive
Order, 30 BUFF. L. REV. 611, 658-62 (1981) (discussing Executive Order 12,114's numerous
shortcomings); see also ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at 466-67 (explaining
three reasons for minimal effects of Executive Order 12,114: "(1) excepted actions far
outnumber the actions to which the order's prescriptions are applicable; (2) even those agency
actions to which the order does apply are not judicially reviewable; and (3) the Reagan
administration has demonstrated little interest in enforcing its provisions").
88. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at 466.
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foreign policy and national security policy of the United States.89
The Order requires agencies to consider the environment outside the
United States, but does so in a manner quite different from that set
forth in NEPA.9" While NEPA's section 102(2) (C) requires an EIS
for every major federal action,91 Executive Order 12,114 separates
major federal actions into four categories 92 and details three types
of documents. 3 The type of document prepared depends on the
category of action being taken.94
Unfortunately, the Order is ineffective in several respects. First, it
is riddled with specific exceptions, 9 as well as numerous opportuni-
89. Exec. Order No. 12,114, supra note 85, at 356.
90. Compare Exec. Order No. 12,114, supra note 85, § 2, at 356 with 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (c)
(1988).
91. See supra note 9 (setting out EIS requirement).
92. Exec. Order No. 12,114, supra note 85, at 356. The four categories are:
(a) major Federal actions significantly affecting the environment of the global
commons outside the jurisdiction of any- nation (e.g., the oceans or Antarctica);
(b) major Federal actions significantly affecting the environment of a foreign nation
not participating with the United States and not otherwise involved in the action;
(c) major Federal actions significantly affecting the environment of a foreign nation
which provide to that nation:
(1) a product, or physical project producing a principal product or an emission or
effluent, which is prohibited or strictly regulated by Federal law in the United States
because its toxic effects on the environment create a serious public health risk; or
(2) a physical project which in the United States is prohibited or strictly regulated
by Federal law to protect the environment against radioactive substances.
(d) major Federal actions outside the United States, its territories and possessions
which significantly affect natural or ecological resources of global importance
designated for protection ....
Id.
93. Exec. Order No. 12,114, supra note 85, § 2-4(a), at 356. The three documents are:
(i) environmental impact statements (including generic, program and specific
statements);
(ii) bilateral or multilateral environmental studies, relevant or related to the proposed
action, by the United States and one or more foreign nations, or by an international
body or organization in which the United States is a member or participant; or
(iii) concise reviews of the environmental issues involved, including environmental
assessments, summary environmental analyses or other appropriate documents.
Id.
94. Exec. Order 12,114, supra note 85, § 2-4(b), at 356. Executive Order 12,114 requires
the following documentation:
(i) for effects described in Section 2-3(a), an environmental impact statement
described in Section 2-4(a) (i);
(ii) for effects described in Section 2-3(b), a document described in Section 2-4(a) (ii)
or (iii), as determined by the agency;
(iii) for effects described in Section 2-3(c), a document described in Section 2-4(a) (ii)
or (iii), as determined by the agency,
(iv) for effects described in Section 2-3(d), a document described in Section 2-4(a) (i),
(ii) or (iii), as determined by the agency.
Id.
95. See Exec. Order 12,114, supra note 85, § 2-5(a), at 356 (listing numerous exempted
actions). Executive Order 12,114 specifically exempts actions not having a significant
environmental effect; actions taken by the President; actions involving the national security, an
armed conflict, intelligence activities and arms transfers, export approvals, and certain actions
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ties for discretionary exemptions96 and modifications.97 Second,
enforcement capabilities are weak because the Order only sets
internal agency procedures, and explicitly cannot be enforced
through a private cause of actionY Third, the source of the Order's
authority is questionable. Because the Order was issued based on
authority independent of NEPA,99 and was not meant to invalidate
any existing regulations,"' it actually did very little to clarify the
scope of NEPA's extraterritorial application.'0
C. Case Law
To date, despite heavy litigation,1°2 judicial interpretation of the
EIS requirement has failed to clarify NEPA's extraterritorial reach.1
03
No case has given a definitive holding on NEPA's general applicability
outside of the United States. In circumstances where NEPA has been
applied beyond U.S. borders, the unique facts of the case have
dictated such a conclusion.0 4 Several cases illustrate this point.
Sierra Club v. Adams"0 5 addressed NEPA's international application
to the U.S. Department of Transportation's role in the construction
relating to nuclear activities; votes and other participation in international organizations and
conferences; and disaster and emergency relief action. Id.
96. See Exec. Order 12,114, supra note 85, § 2-5(c), at 356 (permitting agency exemptions
under special circumstances for emergency situations and for sensitive foreign policy or national
security circumstances).
97. See Exec. Order 12,114, supra note 85, § 2-5(b), at 356 (listing many discretionary
changes to Order's mandated procedure).
98. Exec. Order 12,114, supra note 85, § 3-1, at 356.
99. Exec. Order 12,114, supra note 85, § 1, at 356.
100. Exec. Order 12,114, supra note 85, § 2-4(c), at 356.
101. See Pincus, supra note 87, at 661-62 (discussing Executive Order 12,114's failure to
eliminate executive branch's multifarious stances on implementation of NEPA's procedural
provisions and NEPA's foreign applicability).
102. See, e.g., Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam)
(confronting questions of NEPA's extraterritorial application in regard to trans-Alaska pipeline
and acknowledging that NEPA applies to federal activity in Trust Territory); Environmental
Defense Fund v. United States Agency for Int'l Development, [1976] 6 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20,121 (D.D.C. Dec. 5, 1975) (agreeing before trial, Agency for International Development
acknowledged EIS should be performed for its international pest management program); Sierra
Club v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, [1974] 4 Envtl. L Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,685 (D.D.C. Aug.
3, 1974) (admitting, before trial, Atomic Energy Commission acknowledged that exporting
nuclear plants and fuels requires NEPA EIS); Salpan ex reL Guerrero v. United States Dep't of
Interior, 356 F. Supp. 645 (D. Haw. 1973) (dismissing attempt to stop construction of hotel on
public land in Saipan), aff'd as modifled, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003
(1975); Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Haw. 1973) (considering NEPA's application
to Pacific Island Territories), dited in Keller, supra note 42, at 774-77.
103. See Keller, supra note 42, at 774-80, 799 (concluding that cases give scant guidance and
narrowly limited holdings).
104. See Groy & Wurtzler, supra note 1, at 9, 55 (noting limited scope of NEPA-abroad
decisions).
105. 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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of the Darien Gap portion of the Pan American Highway. 0 6 The
plaintiffs sued the Department of Transportation and the Federal
Highway Administration for their failure to comply with NEPA's EIS
requirement. °7 The district court ordered the Government to file
an adequate EIS.108 In a subsequent proceeding, the plaintiffs chal-
lenged the adequacy of the final EIS."' The district court held that
the EIS remained deficient in its treatment of three issues: (1) the
transmission of foot and mouth disease, (2) the impact on native
Cuna and Choco Indians in the area, and (3) the discussion of
alternative routes for the highway."
0
On appeal, the circuit court reversed the district court's holding,
and found the final EIS to be adequate in the three areas of
concernm."' The court's analysis focused on the project's ramifica-
tions within the United States. 112 First, the court discussed foot and
mouth disease only in the context of its possible spread into the
United States." 3  Second, the court determined that the
Government's final EIS included a "reasonable discussion" of the
alternatives to the highway, which was all that was necessary."
4
Third, the court also found the discussion of the project's impact on
the native population to be adequate." 5 While admitting that the
project would disrupt the native population, the court determined
that NEPA's requirements were met, so long as the agency was
presented with and considered the issue. 6
The court took supplemental briefs on the issue of NEPA's
applicability to construction in Panama,"' but directly addressed the
issue only in a footnote."' While conceding NEPA's applicability to
the project, the Government suggested that NEPA might not apply to
effects of strictly local concern. 1 The Sierra Club, in contrast,
argued that NEPA applied to the project wherever the effects
106. Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The Pan American Highway
is a road system connecting the Western Hemisphere from Alaska to Chile. Id. The last section
to be completed was the Darien Gap Highway, connecting Panama and Columbia. Id.
107. Sierra Club v. Coleman, 405 F. Supp. 53, 54 (D.D.C. 1975).
108. Id. at 56-57.
109. Sierra Club v. Coleman, 421 F. Supp. 63, 65 (D.D.C. 1976).
110. Id. at 65-67.
111. Adams, 578 F.2d at 393-96.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 394-95.
114. Id. at 395-96.
115. Id. at 396.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 391-92 n.14.
119. Id.
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occurred.121 The court failed to resolve the issue. Instead, it
assumed, without deciding, that NEPA applied to the construction
project in Panama.
2 1
In National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML)
v. United States Department of State,122 a federal district court consid-
ered whether an EIS was required for U.S. participation in a herbicide
spraying program in Mexico.12' The case involved U.S. assistance to
a Mexican narcotics eradication program involving spraying chemicals
on marijuana and poppy fields in Mexico.'24 The Government
agreed to prepare an EIS on the effects of the spraying program in
the United States, but was willing to prepare only an "environmental
analysis" of the program's effects in Mexico. 25 NORML, however,
sought a positive judicial ruling that NEPA applied to the entire
program.'
2 6
The court held that U.S. participation in the program constituted
a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, and was subject to NEPA's section 102(2) (C) require-
ments. 27 As was true in Sierra Club v. Adams, 28 the court in
NORML assumed, without deciding, NEPA's applicability,129 based
on the effects of the program within the United States.130  The
court left open the question of NEPA's applicability to all aspects of
the spraying program, being satisfied with the Government's plan to
prepare an EIS for the U.S. effects and an "environmental analysis"
for the Mexican effects.'3 '
A more definitive holding came in Natural Resources Defense Council
v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRDC v. NRC), 32 where the court
addressed the extent to which NEPA requires consideration of the
120. Id.
121. Id. Although the court left the issue unresolved, it did direct attention to several
sources for further guidance: 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331 (a), 4331 (b) (1)-(2), 4331 (c), 4332 (2) (A),
4332(2) (C), 4332(2) (F); 40 C.F.R. § 1500.8(a) (3) (i); CEQ Memorandum, supra note 74; Note,
TheExtraterritorial Scope of NEPA"s Environmental Impact Statement Requirement 74 MICH. L. REV. 349,
365-71 (1975) [hereinafter Extraterritorial Scope of NEPA] (discussing NEPA's legislative history);
Other Countries' Environments, WASH. PosT, Jan. 30, 1978, at A22 (addressing Carter
Administration's handling of environmental regulation of U.S. exports).
122. 452 F. Supp. 1226 (D.D.C. 1978).
123. National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. United States Dep't of
State, 452 F. Supp. 1226, 1228 (D.D.C 1978).
124. Id. at 1231.
125. Id. at 1232.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389, 391-92 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
129. NORML, 452 F. Supp. at 1232-33.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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effects within the recipient foreign country of NRC's nuclear reactor
export licensing.133 That case involved the government of the
Philippines' efforts to acquire its first nuclear generator.14 Westing-
house, which had entered into an arrangement to sell generator
components to the Phillipine's National Power Corporation,135 filed
an export licensing application 3 6 and, despite concerns regarding
the suitability of the site, 37 NRC issued the license.' 38  In its li-
censing decision, the NRC interpreted NEPA to require consideration
of environmental effects only in the United States and the global
commons, not in the Philippines. 3 The court in NRDC v. NRC
reviewed NRC's export license approval, issued without consideration
of environmental impacts on the recipient country. 40  The court
acknowledged that many courts have faced the NEPA-abroad question,
yet none have completely settled it.'4'
In a narrow holding, the court refused to impose NEPA's EIS
requirements on nuclear export decisions when the impact occurs
solely within a foreign country.'42 This decision was based on two
factors that distinguished the case from prior decisions involving
NEPA's extraterritorial application.4 3 First, the court relied on the
presumption against extraterritoriality, such that, lacking an express
congressional mandate, NEPA does not apply extraterritorially.14
Second, the court emphasized the particularly sensitive relationship
that nuclear exports bear to foreign relations.15  Restricting its
decision to the unique facts of the case, the court specifically left
open the question of NEPA's applicability "to some other kind of
major federal action abroad."
146
133. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345, 1366
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
134. Id. at 1351.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. The construction site was in a seismically active area, close to two U.S. military bases.
Id.
138. Id. at 1352.
139. Id. at 1353.
140. Id. at 1346.
141. Id. at 1355.
142. Id. at 1366.
143. Id. at 1367-68. The court noted that the courts in both NORML and Sierra Club v. Adams
assumed, without specifically deciding, that NEPA applied because of effects within the United
States. Id. The two factors that differentiate NRDC v. NRC from those cases are the sensitive
foreign policy element and the fact that the only environmental considerations at issue were
within a foreign country. Id.
144. Id. at 1364, 1366-67.
145. Id. at 1358.
146. Id. at 1366.
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Greenpeace USA v. Ston' 47 was a similarly fact-specific decision.
Pursuant to an agreement between President Reagan and West
German Chancellor Kohl, the U.S. Army was to ship chemical
weapons from West Germany to Johnston Atoll, a U.S. territory in the
Pacific. 4 ' Although environmental impact statements were pre-
pared for separate legs of the shipment, Greenpeace challenged the
lack of a comprehensive EIS and requested that the shipment be en-
joined.
149
Regarding NEPA's applicability to the movement of weapons within
Germany, the c6urt held that NEPA did not apply,5' relying on the
same two factors used in NRDC v. NRC.'5' First, absent an express
congressional mandate, NEPA does not apply within a foreign
country.152 Second, the court emphasized the sensitive foreign
policy implications involved in interfering with an agreement between
the leaders of two nations. 53 The court emphasized that its holding
was limited to the unique factual scenario.'54 Further, the court
suggested that:
In other circumstances, NEPA may require a federal agency to
prepare an EIS for action taken abroad, especially where United
States agency's action abroad has direct environmental impacts
within this country, or where there has clearly been a total lack of
environmental assessment by the federal agency or foreign country
involved.1'5
The preceding line of cases reveals two arms of judicial precedent
on the issue of NEPA's extraterritorial application. First, Sierra Club
v. Adams and NORML had in common that the effects of the chal-
lenged projects were not exclusively outside the United States.'56
Neither court resolved the issue of NEPA's applicability to projects
with strictly international environmental effects. 57 Both courts
147. 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990).
148. Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 752 (D. Haw. 1990).
149. Id. at 753-54.
150. Id. at 761.
151. Id. at 760 (citing Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).




156. See Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (focusing discussion of
construction project's effects on potential spread of disease into United States); National Org.
for The Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. United States Dep't of State, 452 F. Supp. 1226,
1232 (D.D.C. 1978) (discussing spraying project's health consequences in United States of
contaminated marijuana).
157. See supra notes 119, 131 and accompanying text (acknowledging that NEPA may not
apply to effects that are completely outside United States).
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instead assumed, without deciding, that NEPA applied to the
projects.158 This assumption indicates that NEPA applies extra-
territorially only where an action abroad has an environmental effect
within the United States.159 This "effects" approach has previously
been reserved for deciding whether ambiguous market statutes apply
extraterritorially. 6°  Sierra Club v. Adams and NORML indicate an
expansion of the effects test approach to non-market statutes as well.
Alternatively, NRDC v. NRC and Greenpeace USA v. Stone are cases in
which exclusively foreign effects precluded NEPA's extraterritorial
application, based on the presumption against extraterritoriality and
overriding foreign policy considerations. 6'
II. THE CASE: ENVIRONMEvTAL DEFENSE FUND V. MASSEY
A. The Facts
The dispute in Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey arose out of the
National Science Foundation's (NSF) plan to operate a permanent
waste incinerator at its McMurdo Station in Antarctica. 162  The
litigation began inJune 1991, when the Environmental Defense Fund
(EDF) sought a preliminary injunction to prevent NSF from proceed-
ing with the plan. 63 EDF sought to stop the use of an interim in-
cinerator and to prevent the use of a permanent incinerator at
Mclvlurdo Station because of expected toxic pollution.' NSF had
prepared an environmental assessment, but EDF challenged the
incineration plan based on NSF's failure to comply with the EIS
requirements of NEPA.16 NSF moved to dismiss the case for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that NEPA does not apply to
federal actions abroad.
66
In its decision, the district court addressed the issue in less than a
page of reasoning, concluding that NEPA does not apply
158. See supra notes 121, 129 and accompanying text (emphasizing that neither court
determined whether NEPA applies to effects entirely outside United States).
159. See supra notes 112-13, 129-30, 156 and accompanying text (discussing NEPA's
application where significant effects of agency action occur within United States).
160. See Turley, supra note 1, at 611 (stating that courts have used far-reaching "intended
effects" test where defendant intended market effects).
161. See supra notes 144-45, 151-54 and accompanying text (raising reasons why NEPA may
not apply extraterritorially).
162. Environmental Defense Fundv. Massey, 772 F. Supp. 1296, 1296-97 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd,
986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
163. Id.
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extraterritorially.167 In so holding, the district court blindly adhered
to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Aramco that U.S. legislation
is territorially confined, absent a showing that Congress clearly
expressed an intention that the challenged measure apply
extraterritorially.
168
In its attempt to determine Congress' intent, the district court in
Massey refused to examine NEPA's legislative history.169  The court
acknowledged the broad language of the statute, yet resisted finding
that Congress' deliberate choice of broad language indicated an
extraterritorial intent ° Basing its decision on Aramco, the district
court held that NEPA does not apply to a federal agency's decision to
construct and operate garbage incinerators in Antarctica. 171 Conse-
quently, the district court dismissed the action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
172
Apparently troubled by its own decision, the district court comment-
ed in a footnote that many of the problems presented by the case
could have been avoided if NSF had complied with NEPA.173 In the
final section of the opinion, the district court also expressed its
"concern[] with the manner in which NSF undertook the Environ-
mental Impact Assessment," stating that, if the Court did assert subject
matter jurisdiction, a different outcome might follow. 4  Indeed,
the outcome ultimately was different, as the district court's holding
was reversed on appeal.
175
B. The Decision on Appeal
In January 1993, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed the district court and held that NEPA's EIS
provision applied to NSF's decision to build waste incinerators at
McMurdo Station."' The court held that "the presumption against
extraterritoriality does not apply to this case." 77
167. Id.
168. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S.
244,248 (1991); seesupra notes 29-40 and accompanying text (explaining Aramco's interpretation
of Foley as irrebuttable presumption against extraterritoriality).
169. Massey, 772 F. Supp. at 1297 (maintaining that, because Congress failed to explicitly
apply NEPA extraterritorially, court did not need to examine legislative record for congressional
intent).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1298.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1298 n.1.
174. Id. at 1298.
175. SeeEnvironmental Defense Fundv. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that
presumption against extraterritorial application of NEPA does not apply).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 533.
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1. The presumption against extraterritoriality is not applicable
The circuit court provided two rationales for its conclusion that the
application of NEPA to NSF's Antarctica waste incineration plans is
not covered by the presumption against extraterritoriality. 78 First,
NEPA regulates the procedure of federal agency decision-making, a
predominately domestic activity.179  Second, the effects of the
regulated conduct are felt in Antarctica, a continent considered a
"global common" with unique characteristics.'
The circuit court began its analysis with a discussion of the
presumption against extraterritorial application. 8 ' The court delin-
eated three definite exceptions to the presumption: (1) where
Congress clearly expressed its intention to apply the statute beyond
the United States borders, (2) where neglecting to apply the statute
extraterritorially would have harmful effects inside the United States,
and (3) where the statute regulates conduct that occurs within the
United States. 182 The circuit court in Massey criticized the district
court for not conducting a closer examination of the extraterritoriality
issue.
83
Pursuant to its critical analysis of the district court's decision, the
circuit court examined the conduct regulated by NEPA, the unique
status of Antarctica, the foreign policy considerations under NEPA,
and finally, NEPA's statutory language and subsequent interpreta-
tion. 4 According to the circuit court, Congress had the authority
to enact NEPA because the provisions regulate domestic decision-
making processes."' In deciding that NEPA does not present a
question of extraterritoriality, the circuit court focused on the
domestic'8 6 and procedural 8 7 nature of the statute.18 8  The
178. Id. at 532.
179. Id. at 529.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 530-32.
182. Id. at 531-32.
183. See id. at 532 (noting particularly that district court failed to characterizc location of
conduct regulated by NEPA and assess potential for conflict of laws problem).
184. Id. at 529-37.
185. See id. at 532 ("By enacting NEPA, Congress exercised its statutory authority to
determine the factors an agency must consider when exercising its discretion, and created a
process whereby American officials, while acting within the United States, can reach enlightened
policy decisions by taking into account environmental effects.").
186. Id.; see also Mary A. McDougall, Comment, Extraterritoriality and the Endangered Species Act
of 1973, 80 GEO. L.J. 435, 445 (1991) (reasoning that because agency decision-making occurs
within United States, it is domestic activity), cited in Massey, 986 F.2d at 532.
187. See Massey, 986 F.2d at 532. The court explained: "NEPA, unlike many environmental
statutes, does not dictate agency policy or determine the fate ofcontemplated action .... NEPA
simply mandates a particular process that must be followed by a federal agency before taking
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court cited cases interpreting NEPA as a procedural statute.' 89
The circuit court analogized NEPA to other statutes that focus on
federal decision-making and do not command specific results outside
the United States, 19° such as the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961191
and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act.192 Both statutes require the
Government to consider the degree to which other countries
cooperate with U.S. policy goals, 19 namely the integration of
women into the economy194 and the nonproliferation of nuclear
weapons.195
Focusing on NEPA's domestic character, the court rejected the
contention that NEPA would present a choice of law problem or a
conflict with another sovereign's laws.' 96  Summarizing its holding,
the circuit court stated that because "NEPA is designed to regulate
conduct occurring within the territory of the United States, and
imposes no substantive requirements which could be interpreted to
govern conduct abroad, the presumption against extraterritoriality
does not apply to this case." 9 ' The case was thus distinct from
action significantly affecting the human environment." Id.; see also Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350-51 (1989) ("Although these procedures are almost certain
to affect the agency's substantive decision, it is now well settled that NEPA itself does not
mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process. ... NEPA merely
prohibits uninformed-rather than unwise-agency action."); Marsh v. Oregon Natural
Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989) ("NEPA does not work by mandating that agencies
achieve particular substantive environmental results."); Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v.
Karlen, Inc., 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980) (holding that NEPA requires no more than
consideration of environmental consequences of federal agency decisions); Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) ("NEPA
does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is
essentially procedural.., to insure a fully informed and well-considered decision.... ."); Kleppe
v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (indicating that court's role in evaluating NEPA
compliance is not to judge substance of agency's decisions, but to confirm agency has taken
"hard look" at environmental effects); Yost, supra note 58, at 29 ("NEPA is not a law that says
,no.' It is not a command-and-control statute of the sort that might properly be said to infringe
on other nations' sovereignty by telling them what to do.").
188. Massey, 986 F.2d at 532.
189. Id. at 530-32 (citing Robertson, 490 U.S. 332; Sthycker's Bay, 444 U.S. 223).
190. Id. at 533. According to the court: "Just as these statutes fall short of prescribing action
in foreign jurisdictions, and are instead directed at the regulation of agency decision-making,
NEPA also creates no substantive environmental standards and simply prescribes by statute the
factors an agency must consider when exercising its discretionary authority." Id.
191. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151(k), 2218(c) (1988).
192. Id. §§ 3201-82; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2156, 2157 (1988).
193. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151(k), 2218(c) (requiring Agency for International Development to
factor into development assistance decisions extent to which women are integrated into
economy and possibility of assistance supporting democracy); id. §§ 3201-82; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2156,
2157 (requiring Nuclear Regulatory Commission to factor into nuclear exportlicensing decisions
extent of cooperation with U.S. nonproliferation goals).
194. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151(k), 2218(c).
195. Id. §§ 3201-82; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2156, 2157.
196. Massey, 986 F.2d at 533.
197. Id.
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those involving Title VII of the Civil Rights Ace 9 and the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA),199 which have been held to apply only
within the United States based on the presumption against extraterri-
toriality.
20
2. The unique status of Antarctica
The circuit court next supported its decision that the presumption
against extraterritoriality did not apply by addressing Antarctica's
unique legal status.01 Citing Aramco, the circuit court in Massey
emphasized the importance of determining whether Congress
intended to apply the statute to regions over which the United States
exercises some financial or legislative control.02 The court also
cited two cases, Sierra Club v. Adams and Enewetak v. Laird,0 3 in
which courts relied on such a showing to hold that the presumption
against extraterritoriality was overcome and NEPA did in fact apply.
2 4
Antarctica is unique because it is the only sovereignless conti-
nent.2 5 Members of the international community have agreed not
to assert claim to the territory.2°1 Concerning Antarctica's legal
status, the question arises whether Antarctica is a foreign country or
part of the global commons.207 This determination has yet to be
settled by the courts.20 ' The legal status of Antartica is often
198. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988) (prohibiting discriminatory employment
practices based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
199. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988) (waiving sovereign immunity and allowing United States to
be sued for tort claims).
200. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S.
244, 252 (1991) (holding that if Congress intended Title VII to apply extraterritorially, it would
have addressed subject of foreign law and procedure conflicts); Smith v. United States, 932 F.2d
791, 793 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that FTCA was not intended to apply extraterritorially).
201. Massey, 986 F.2d at 533.
202. See id. ("Thus, where the U.S. has some real measure of legislative control over the
region at issue, the presumption against extraterritoriality is much weaker." (citing Aramco, 499
U.S. at 248)).
203. 353 F. Supp. 811, 819 (D. Haw. 1973) (upholding NEPA's application to trust territory
of pacific islands where Government planned to conduct simulated nuclear testing).
204. Massey, 986 F.2d at 533; see also Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (distinguishing case from Wilderness
Society v. Morton, 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972): "A significant substantive difference between
our case and Wilderness Society was the ongoing control exercised by the United States with
respect to the (trans-Alaskan] pipeline.").
205. Massey, 986 F.2d at 529.
206. Id.; see Antarctica Treaty, 12 U.S.T. 794 (Dec. 1, 1959).
207. See generally Colin Deihl, Antarctica: An International Laboratoiy, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 423, 430-32, 433-37 (1991) (discussing Antarctica's scientific and global significance and its
legal regime).
208. Compare Smith v. United States, 932 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding FTCA does not
apply to claims occurring in Antarctica, as Antarctica is foreign country within meaning of
IFTCA) with Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 91 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding FTCA does apply
to claims arising in Antarctica, as Antarctica is not foreign country within meaning of FTCA).
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209analogized to outer space. The court in Massey concluded that
Antarctica is part of the "global commons" and is not a foreign
country.2 0 The court asserted that the United States exercises
significant legislative control over Antarctica, including control of all
air transportation to Antarctica, all search and rescue operations
there, and the presence of McMurdo Station and other American
research installations established under United States Antarctica
Program.2 11 Thus, the court reasoned that " It] his legislative control,
taken together with the status of Antarctica as a sovereignless
continent, compels the conclusion that the presumption against
extraterritoriality is particularly inappropriate under the circumstances
presented in this case." 2  The circuit court found that this conclu-
sion circumvented the problem created when U.S. laws conflict with
laws of another sovereign nation because Antarctica is not subject to
the sovereign rule of any other nation.1 3
3. Foreign policy considerations
The circuit court then reviewed the foreign policy ramifications of
NEPA's extraterritorial application. The NSF acknowledged that
policies regarding Antarctica did not present a conflict of laws
between the United States and a foreign sovereign.214 The NSF did
assert, however, that compliance with NEPA would hinder cooperation
with other nations concerning Antarctica and that, therefore, the
presumption against extraterritoriality remained an appropriate
restraint on NEPA's application in Antarctica. 21 '5  NSF objected to
being subjected to NEPA's EIS requirements on two grounds.
216
First, preparation of an EIS and the risk of a NEPA injunction would
hamper the ability of the United States to work in conjunction with
209. Beattie, 756 F.2d at 93-94, 98-99 (discussing nature of Antarctica and analogizing it to
outer space).
210. Massey, 986 F.2d at 529; see also id. at 533-34 (reiterating Antarctica's status as country
not foreign to United States).
211. Id. at 534; see also Beattie 756 F.2d at 93, in which the court noted:
The United States currently operates four active year-round stations, several summer
camps, and numerous temporary tent cities in Antarctica. McMurdo Base is America's
largest station, with a summer population in excess of 850 persons and a winter
population of about 92. It consists of approximately 130 buildings. McMurdo Station
has been assigned a zip code by the United States Postal Service.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
212. Massey, 986 F.2d at 534.
213. Id. (asserting that exercise of jurisdiction in global commons, of which Antarctica is
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other countries in Antarctica.217 Second, NEPA requirements would
be incompatible with requirements under the Protocol on Environ-
mental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty.218 The court rejected the
NSF's foreign policy arguments, 219 citing other decisions involving
nuclear exports and national security to illustrate that when U.S.
foreign policy interests outweigh the benefits obtained from prepara-
tion of an EIS, the EIS requirement may be avoided. 220  The court
concluded, however, that forcing NSF to comply with NEPA in
Antarctica would not threaten U.S. foreign policy, unless a "unique
and delicate" foreign policy interest is involved.221
4. Statutory interpretation
Finally, the court in Massey examined the plain language of NEPA
and its subsequent interpretation.222 The court read the text of
section 102(2) (C), the EIS provision, as applicable to NSF's plan of
action in Antarctica. 22 ' Attacking NSF's limited view of the EIS
requirement, the court insisted that section 102(2) (C) clearly extends
beyond U.S. borders.224
The court also took issue with NSF's argument that section
102(2) (F)225 is NEPA's sole command for agencies engaging in
217. Id.
218. Id. (arguing that, if adopted, Antarctic Treaty would conflict with agency decision-
making under NEPA) (citing Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, 30
I.L.M. 1461 (1991)).
219. Id. at 534-35. The court was unpersuaded by both of NSF's arguments. First, the
Protocol has not been ratified by the United States, so concern over potential conflict with
congressional procedural requirements is unnecessary. Id. Additionally, the requirements of
the two regulatory schemes are similar and are easily complied with simultaneously making the
argument that their incompatibility would result in international discord moot. Id. at 535.
Second, and "[m] ore importantly, [the court is] not convinced that NSF's ability to cooperate
with other nations in Antarctica in accordance with U.S. foreign policy will be hampered by
NEPA injunctions." Id.
220. Id. at 535 (citing Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
647 F.2d 1345, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (interpreting NEPA to exclude cases of nuclear exports);
Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 796, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (refusing
to enjoin underground nuclear testing due to possible adverse effects on national security and
foreign policy)).
221. Id.
222. See id. at 536 (citing City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912
F.2d 478, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting that explicit purpose of NEPA is to take account of crises
that are present and pending not only in this country but in whole world); Enewetak v. Laird,
353 F. Supp. 811, 816 (D. Haw. 1973) (noting that broad language of statute is clear indication
of conscious effort not to restrict NEPA's applicability)); id. ("[T]he sweep ofNEPA is extraordi-
narily broad, compelling consideration of any and all types of environmental impact of federal
action." (quoting Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n,
449 F.2d 1109, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1971))).
223. Id. at 535-36.
224. Id. at 536 ("Clearly, Congress painted with a far greater brush than NSF is willing to
apply.").
225. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (F) (1988).
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international activities. 26 Rather, all federal agencies must comply
with section 102227 and all its subsections.22 s Federal agencies
accordingly have a duty to prepare an EIS on major activities and to
consider the environmental impacts in a global sense. 29
Unfortunately, the court in Massey concluded its decision with a
limiting statement:
We find it important to note, however, that we do not decide
today how NEPA might apply to actions in a case involving an
actual foreign sovereign or how other U.S. statutes might apply to
Antarctica. We only hold that the alleged failure of NSF to comply
with NEPA before resuming incineration in Antarctica does not
implicate the presumption against extraterritoriality." °
III. ANALYSIS
A. Clear Holding Unclear Reasoning May Limit Precedential Weight
The court in Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey clearly held that
the presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply to NSF's
efforts to avoid preparing an EIS in Antarctica.3 ' The particular
rationale by which the court arrived at its conclusion, however, is un-
clear.12 Is it NEPA's essentially procedural and domestic nature, or
Antarctica's status as an "international anomaly," which warrants
dispensing with the presumption against extraterritoriality?
When faced with the NEPA-abroad question in future cases, courts
will be able to cite Massey to support two different propositions.
Relying on the court's determination that NEPA only guides the
domestic decision-making process of federal agencies,233 courts may
hold that NEPA applies to all federal agency decisions, regardless of
the presumption against extraterritoriality and the location of the
226. See Massey, 986 F.2d at 536 (concluding that NSF's reading ignores interrelationship
between statute's sections and subsections).
227. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (detailing nine subsections applicable to federal agencies).
228. Massey, 986 F.2d at 536 (stating that compliance with § 102(2) (F) does not substitute
for compliance with § 102(2) (C)).
229. See id. (recognizing that compliance with § 102(2) (C), which requires an EIS, does not
relieve agencies of their global duties); see also Extratenitorial Scope of NEPA, supra note 121, at
361-62 (arguing that §§ 102(2) (C) and 102(2) (F) should be read together). But see Kass &
Gerard, supra note 2, at 29 (noting debate surrounding reading of two sections).
230. Massey, 986 F.2d at 537.
231. See id. at 533 (holding NEPA's applicability to apply exclusively to conduct occurring
within United States); see also supra notes 178-230 and accompanying text (discussing reasons
court in Massey did not apply presumption against extraterritoriality).
232. See Wirth, supra note 11, at 633-35 (discussing various potential interpretations of
Massey).
233. See supra notes 183-96 and accompanying text (characterizing NEPA as domestic,
procedural statute).
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activity's effects. This interpretation focuses on the conduct to be
regulated and the environmentally conscious decisions of the
agencies, rather than the extraterritoriality of the projects. Tradi-
tionally, such conduct tests have been reserved for market cases.
234
Liberalization of the strict presumption against an extraterritoriality
would be a significant step towards recognizing the transnational
character of environmental problems.235 On the other hand, courts
may conclude that Massey's international application of NEPA is
restricted solely to Antarctica,236 and that Massey carries no weight
anywhere else in the world.237 In either case, Massey decided NEPA
must yield when outweighed by foreign policy considerations.3 8
NEPA Coalition ofJapan v. Aspin,239 which was decided after Massey,
sheds light on how Massey may be interpreted. The case involved
preparation of an EIS for U.S. military installations in Japan.2 40 The
plaintiffs contended that Massey dictated that NEPA applied over-
seas. 24' The court, however, rejected that argument and espoused
the presumption against extraterritoriality, concluding that NEPA did
not apply.242 The court distinguished the facts of Massey, pointing
out that the court in Massey viewed Antarctica as analogous to outer
space, not a foreign sovereign country.243 The court found that a
military base in Japan warrants a different analysis from a research
facility in Antarctica, 244 especially given the sensitive treaty and
foreign policy considerations involved.245  The court determined
that preparation of an EIS would potentially upset the existing treaty
relationship.24 6
234. See Turley, supra note 1, at 614-17 (describing conduct test for extraterritoriality in
securities regulation cases).
235. See Turley, supra note 1, at 656-67 (tracing transnational expansion of judicial and
legislative perspective in antitrust, securities, and employment cases).
236. See Massey, 986 F.2d at 537 (limiting its holding to NEPA compliance failures in
Antarctica).
237. See supra text accompanying note 230 (leaving unresolved questions of applicability of
NEPA to foreign sovereigns).
238. See Massey, 986 F.2d at 535 (citing line of cases refusing to issue injunctions under NEPA
when there is conflict between enforcement and foreign policy considerations).
239. 837 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1993).
240. NEPA Coalition ofJapan v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466, 466-67 (D.D.C. 1993).
241. Id. at 467.
242. Id. at 467-68.
243. Id. at 467 (concluding that Massey does not control in case of internationally recognized
foreign sovereign).
244. Id.
245. Id. (citing Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Jan. 19, 1960, U.S.-Japan, 11
U.S.T. 1633, 1634 (securingJapanese use of some U.S. bases); Status of Forces Agreement, Feb.
28, 1952, U.S.-Japan, 3 U.S.T. 3342, 3353 (noting that treaty provisions also provide for
subcommittee to address environmental concerns)).
246. See NEPA Coalition ofJapan, 837 F. Supp. at 467.
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NEPA Coalition ofJapan is not necessarily inconsistent with Massey.
Rather, the court utilized the foreign policy exception247 implicit in
the Massey decision.24 The court in NEPA Coalition of Japan con-
cluded that the presumption against extraterritoriality applied with
particular force because the case involved a foreign sovereign where
treaty relationships and foreign policy concerns existed.249
B. Benefits of an International NEPA
Despite the contrary determination of some courts, consistent
application of NEPA to the international activities of federal agencies
is beneficial to the United States for two reasons. First, compliance
with NEPA requirements abroad will help protect the United States
from the creation of, and liability for, international disasters."
One basis for liability for environmental damage can be found in
principle 21 of The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environ-
ment.25' Second, the United States' international reputation will be
improved by taking a leadership role in protection of the global
environment.1 2  Why should the United States have one environ-
mental standard for actions it takes within its borders, and a lesser
standard for actions it takes elsewhere?
NEPA's enactment in 1969 heralded a new era in international
environmental protection. Other nations have followed suit with
similar legislation of their own."5  The United Nations, 4 the
247. Id. at 468.
248. See Massey, 986 F.2d at 535 (noting NEPA should not be applied where conflict exists
with foreign policy); see also Wirth, supra note 11, at 633-34 (discussing Massey's treatment of
extraterritorial application of NEPA when foreign policy considerations are involved).
249. See NEPA Coalition ofJapan, 837 F. Supp. at 467-68 (noting hesitance to apply NEPA
when treaty relationships are likely to be affected).
250. See Turley, supra note 1, at 640-42 (noting serious environmental impacts of
transnational activities).
251. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, at 3, 5, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1973), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420 (1972):
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles
of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to
their own environmental policies and the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states
or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Id.
252. See Denise E. Antolini, Extending NEPA Is in Our Nationallnteres 8 ENVrL. F., Nov./Dec.
1991, at 26, 27 ("The extraterritorial application of NEPA would strengthen, not cripple, the
United States' political and moral force by eliminating the double standard that honesty is
warranted at home, but not abroad.").
253. See Michelle B. Nowlin, What's Good for the Goose Is Goodfor the Gander:. A Plea for Congress
to Amend the National Environmental Policy Act to Apply to the Extraterritorial Actions of the Federal
Government 2 DuKE ENvrL. L & POLy' F. 122, 138 (1991-92) (recognizing that NEPA is used as
model by 87 other nations and most multinational development banks for developing similar
environmental impact assessment legislation); see also id. at 137 n.140 (citing collection of
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European Community, 5 and the World Bank"SS have all adopted
environmental impact assessment agreements.257 The next step for




In light of NEPA's inconsistent international application, Congress
must amend the National Environmental Policy Act. After the
Supreme Court's decision in Aramco that Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act did not apply extraterritorially,259 Congress amended Title VII
with an amendment entitled "Protection of Extraterritorial Employ-
ment."260  Similarly, Congress should now amend NEPA to apply
extraterritorially.
261
Congress has introduced amendments to internationalize NEPA,
but none have been passed into law. InJanuary 1991, Representative
Bill Bradley (D-N.J.) and Senator Frank R. Lautenberg (D-N.J.) co-
sponsored S. 1278,262 a bill that would have amended NEPA to
clarify its application not only to federal actions within the United
States, but to all federal actions. 63 While NEPA already provides
international environmental assessment laws).
254. See id. at 122 (citing UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT IN A TRANSBOUNDARY CONTExT, Feb. 25, 1991, 30 1.L.M. 800 [hereinafter EsPoO
CONVENTION]).
255. COUNCIL DIRECTIVE ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF CERTAIN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE PROJECTS ON THE ENVIRONMENT, U.N. Doc. 85/337/EEC (1985), 1985 O.J. (L 175) 40
[hereinafter EC DIRECTIVE]; see infra notes 278-82 (discussing exemption provisions of EC
Directive).
256. WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE 4.01 [hereinafter OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE 4.01];
see infra note 283 (noting specific directive governing World Bank).
257. See generally Kass & Gerrard, supra note 2, at 28-29 (discussing international environmen-
tal assessment compacts).
258. See Nowlin, supra note 253, at 138 (urging strengthening of U.S. commitment to
international environmental protection for purpose of encouraging similar development in
international community); see alsoJoan R. Goldfarb, Extraterritorial Compliance with NEPA Amid
the Current Wave of Environmental Alarm, 18 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REV. 543, 557 (1991) (arguing
that international recognition of environmental concerns mandates NEPA's extraterritorial
application).
259. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 258
(1991) (holding that argument in favor of application is "insufficiently weighty" to overcome
presumption against extraterritoriality).
260. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(a), 105 Stat. 1071,1077 (amending
42 U.S.C. § 2000e). See generaUyJacqueline E. Bailey, Note, Title VII Protections Do Not Extend to
Americans Working Overseas: EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991), 5
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 417, 442-44 (1992) (discussing amendment to Title VII that extends definition
of employee to American workers abroad).
261. See generally Nowlin, supra note 253 (arguing for amendment of NEPA).
262. See 137 CONG. REC. S7633 (daily ed. June 12, 1991) (statement of Rep. Bradley) (co-
sponsoring Environmental Assessment, Closure, and Health Act of 1991).
263. S. 1278, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1(b)(1). The bill would have amended § 102(2)(C) of
NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C), so that an environmental impact statement would be required
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flexibility for foreign policy concerns,2" the proposed amendment
in S. 1278 included six specific situations exempted from the EIS re-
quirement "[actions] taken to protect the national security of the
United States, votes in international conferences and organizations,
actions taken in the course of an armed conflict, strategic intelligence
actions, armament transfers, or judicial or administrative civil or
criminal enforcement actions."265 In addition, S. 1278 contemplated
a case-by-case review by the President to exempt from the EIS
requirement a federal agency's extraterritorial actions, if there existed
a compelling interest to do so.2 6  Despite the fact that S. 1278
should have quelled any foreign policy concerns with its extensive list
of exceptional circumstances,267 the proposed bill never made it out
of committee.
The most recent attempt to amend NEPA to clarify its application
to extraterritorial federal actions is H.R. 3219.26 The amendment
proposes to add "extraterritorial major federal actions significantly
affecting the environment" to the category of activities requiring
detailed environmental impact statements. 69 In defining an extra-
territorial major federal action, the proposed bill provides for the
same exemptions found in S. 12787.27 H.R. 3219 specifically subjects
trade agreements to EIS requirements. 71 This most recent pro-
posed amendment would also overturn part of Executive Order
12,114,272 as it affords judicial relief for failure by the President to
for major federal actions, "including extraterritorial actions." Id.
264. See42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1988) (encouraging application of NEPA in all situations where
it is "consistent with other essential considerations of national policy"); see also id. § 4334 (stating
that compliance with NEPA is not required where inconsistent with other statutory obligations
of agencies).
265. S. 1278, supra note 263, § l(b)(1).
266. S. 1278, supra note 263, § 1(b) (6).
267. See S. REP. No. 180, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1991) (noting approximately 20
circumstances to which proposed act would take exception).
268. H.R. 3219, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
269. See id. § 1 (c) (2) (expanding scope of EIS requirements to international situations).
270. Id. For purposes of H.R. 3219, an extraterritorial major federal action:
(A) includes any major Federal action in the United States that has effects outside the
United States; and
(B) does not include any Federal action taken to protect the national security of the
United States, votes in international conferences and organizations, actions taken in
the course of an armed conflict, strategic intelligence actions, armament transfers, or
judicial or administrative civil or criminal enforcement actions.
Id.
271. Id. § 1 (c). This provision likely stems from recent debate over NAFTA's subjection to
NEPA's ETS requirement. See Public Citizen v. Office of U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp.
21 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549,551 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (reversing decision requiring EIS for NAFTA
because court held there is no final action until President submits agreement to Congress), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
272. See supra notes 85-101 and accompanying text (discussing Executive Order 12,114).
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comply, which can be pursued by any agency aware of noncompli-
ance.
273
It is imperative that Congress recognize the United States'
obligation to maintain the environmental sanctity of the earth's
common environment.2 4 This duty is easily compatible with foreign
policy considerations, as evidenced by three major environmental
impact assessment agreements.2 75  First, in 1991, United Nations
members concluded the Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact
Assessment in a Transboundary Context.276  The Espoo Convention
requires signatories engaging in activities with transboundary effects
to notify affected nations and permit them to participate in the
environmental impact assessment.
277
Second, in 1985, the European Communities adopted a Council
Directive27 that requires member nations to make environmental
assessments of all major projects likely to have significant environ-
mental impacts. 279  Factors for which environmental impacts must
be assessed are: humans, flora and fauna, soil, water, air, climate, and
the landscape; the interaction between the prior factors; and material
assets and cultural heritage. 20  The only exemption from the
assessment requirement is for projects relating to national de-
fense.281  The procedure for information-sharing and assessment
282
273. See H.R. 3219, supra note 268, § 1(c) (noting amendment that allows for judiciary to
take enforcement action when President is in noncompliance).
274. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 23, § 601 (1) (b). According to the Restatement:
A state is obligated to take such measures as may be necessary, to the extent practicable
under the circumstances, to ensure that activities within its jurisdiction or control arc
conducted so as not to cause significant injury to the environment of another state or
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Id.
275. See supra notes 254-57 and accompanying text (noting that United Nations, World Bank,
and European Community have all formulated assessment agreements).
276. EsPoo CONVENTION, supra note 254.
277. See EsPOo CONVENTION, supra note 254, art. III(1) (indicating that notification should
be given no later than time when country's own public is informed).
278. EC DIRECTIV, supra note 255. See generally Louis L. Bono, The Implementation of the EC
Directive on Environmental Impact Assessments with the English Planning System: A Refinement of the
NEPA Process, 9 PACE ENVTL L. REV. 155 (1991).
279. EC DIRECTIVE, supra note 255, art. I(1).
280. EC DIRECTwE, supra note 255, art. III.
281. EC DIRETIVE, supra note 255, art. 1(4). This exemption provision is simpler, yct more
restrictive, than that of any proposed amendments to NEPA. See supra note 267 and
accompanying text (describing recent exemptions proposed to amend NEPA for extraterritorial
application).
282. The directive provides:
Where a Member State is aware that a project is likely to have significant effects on the
environment in another Member State or where a Member State likely to be
significantly affected so requests, the Member State in whose territory the project is
intended to be carried out shall forward the information gathered pursuant to Article
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is a paradigm of cooperation, and should be adopted by the United
States to achieve the dual goal of environmental responsibility and
international comity.
Third, World Bank Operational Directive 4.01 requires environ-
mental assessments for all development projects that may have
significant environmental impacts. 3 The United States and other
countries place international pressure on the World Bank to improve
its environmental standards. 84 Specifically, the United States passed
legislation encouraging sustainable development in multilateral
development bank projects." One provision forbids the United
States' Executive Directors of the multilateral development banks to
vote for a proposed action that would have a significant environmen-
tal impact, absent a proper assessment of the project.
2 86
This Note recommends that Congress amend NEPA to apply
extraterritorially, following the example of the United Nations, the
European Community, and the World Bank. The court in Massey
projected such a role for NEPA, likening the statute to "the myriad of
laws directing federal decision-makers to consider particular factors
before extending aid or engaging in certain types of trade.1287 The
exemptions to NEPA's extraterritorial application should be reduced
to one exemption for national security purposes.288 This exemption
finds its basis in the Massey opinion holding that NEPA's EIS
requirement must yield to U.S. foreign policy interests.2 89 Concur-
rently, the United States should continue to work toward negotiating
multilateral agreements governing procedures for full environmental
5 to the other Member State at the same time as it makes it available to its own
nationals. Such information shall serve as a basis for any consultations necessary in the
framework of the bilateral relations between two Member States on a reciprocal and
equivalent basis.
EC DIRECTIVE, supra note 255, art. VII.
283. OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE 4.01, supra note 256; see also Young, supra note 43, at 327-28
(describing World Bank Operational Directive 4.01 and its proposal to assess all projects for
environmental impact); Brian B.A. McAllister, The United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development: An Opportunity to Forge a New Unity in the Work of the World Bank Among Human Rights,
the Environment, and Sustainable Development 16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 689, 703-05
(1993) (discussing contents and effectiveness of World Bank Operational Directive 4.01).
284. See McAllister, supra note 283, at 740-43 (discussing national efforts to pressure World
Bank into raising standards of environmental protection and human rights).
285. 22 U.S.C. §§ 262m to 262m-5 (1988); see also McAllister, supra note 283, at 742
(discussing effects of the International Development and Finance Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
240, 103 Stat. 2492).
286. 22 U.S.C. § 262m-7(a).
287. Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
288. SeeEC DIRECTIVE, supra note 255, art. I (exempting only those projects serving national
defense purposes).
289. Masmey, 986,F.2d at 535.
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assessment and disclosure. 290
CONCLUSION
As the latest in a muddled line of cases interpreting the extrater-
ritorial reach of NEPA's EIS requirement, Massey has the potential to
support future extension of NEPA to all federal agency action abroad.
Whether that potential will be realized is yet to be seen. Certainly,
Massey attests to the need to clarify NEPA's extraterritorial reach.
Congress should activate legislation amending NEPA. NEPA's
international evolution is natural and necessary to foster the United
States' role as the world leader in preventive environmental protec-
tion legislation.
290. See Grundman, supra note 36, at 258-59 (discussing alternatives to imperialistic
exportation of U.S. laws).
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